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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to study the idea of obedience in early-modern Catholic political thought. I focus on early seventeenth-
century Venice and on one of its leading political thinkers, Paolo Sarpi. I argue that for Sarpi and the Venetian nobility obedience 
was a religious, Catholic concept, which they nonetheless applied to a secular system of governance; notwithstanding their refusal 
to obey the papal ban during the interdict of Venice in 1606-1607, Venetians regarded obedience as an act of piety and an indis-
pensable element of civic life. 
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eL VoTo De oBeDIenCIa De PaoLo SarPI: PenSamIenTo PoLÍTICo en La 
VENECIA DE LA CONTRARREFORMA
Resumen
El objetivo de este artículo es estudiar la idea de obediencia en el pensamiento político católico de la edad moderna, en par-
ticular en Venecia en el siglo xvii y en Paolo Sarpi, uno de sus pensadores políticos más importantes. Este artículo argumenta que 
para Sarpi y la nobleza la obediencia era un concepto católico, que a pesar de ello, aplicaron a un sistema de gobierno secular. A 
pesar de su negativa a obedecer la prohibición papal durante el interdicto de Venecia en 1606-1607, los venecianos consideraban 
la obediencia como un acto de piedad y un elemento indispensable de la vida cívica.
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In this essay I explore the idea of obedience in early-
modern Catholic political thought. In so doing, I focus on 
Venice –the Catholic republic renown for its rivalry with 
and disobedience to Rome– and Paolo Sarpi (1552-1623), 
the historian, polymath and adviser to the senate of Venice. 
Sarpi was a well-known defender of Venice during the inter-
dict crisis (1606-1607), the event which saw pope Paul V 
excommunicating the senate of Venice (including Sarpi 
and other advisers) and placing the republic under inter-
dict.1 While this would have been a major challenge for any 
Christian’s confidence, I argue that the excommunication 
1  Bouwsma, W. 1968. Venice and the denfense of Republican 
Liberty: 340-358, 371-415. University of California Press; Cozzi, G. 1995. 
Venezia Barocca: conflitti di uomini e idee nella crisi del Seicento venezi-
ano: 77-120. Venezia: Il Cardo; Wootton, D. 1983. Paolo Sarpi between 
failed to undermine Venetian patricians’ self-image as good 
Catholics and obedient sons of the church. Furthermore, I 
argue that for them –and for Sarpi– obedience remained a 
pivotal Catholic concept, one that they considered instru-
mental to pious life. At the same time, nothing suggests 
that Venetians would have identified disobedience to the 
papal interdict with violation against God or Catholicism. 
Rather than an instance of impiety, Venetians regarded 
their disobedience as a consequence of the pope’s abuse 
of his authority. The interdict of Venice –and the intransi-
gence of the Venetian leadership– posed a major challenge 
to the papacy, not least because of the enormous publicity 
it received across Europe. 
Renaissance and Enlightenment: 46-76. Cambridge University Press; 
Kainulainen, J. 2014. Paolo Sarpi: A Servant of God and State: 195-203. 
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Without compromising their faith, Venetians remained 
loyal to Catholicism, which, they believed, buttressed 
the social discipline and order within the territory of the 
republic. As Gaetano Cozzi put it, Venetians’ Catholic creed 
“guaranteed respect to hierarchy, to authority” and, while 
teaching Venetians the moral norms “indispensable for 
good coexistence”, acted as “an invite to order” and to a 
calm acceptance of their “lot as subjects”.2 In this study I 
suggest that Sarpi and the giovani, the political party which 
was in power during the interdict crisis, identified Catholic 
obedience with divine right theory and, consequently, with 
unconditional submission to secular authority. Sympathetic 
to French Gallicanism and the Oath of Allegiance of James 
I, the Venetians considered their disobedience to the pope 
compatible with their Catholic creed. 
Paradoxically, it is necessary to acknowledge the 
Venetians’ view of themselves as pious Catholics to under-
stand their disobedience to the pope, the head of the 
Catholic world. It is also against this background –Catholic, 
pious, and conservative– that we should read Paolo Sarpi. 
Only then it becomes understandable how a humble friar 
could oppose himself to the pope without losing the support 
of the Catholic leaders of his own community. We also need 
to pose the question of what exactly Venetians understood 
by obedience in terms of political and religious thought. As 
a scholarly topic ‘obedience’ might seem allusive of obso-
lete, old-fashioned research about power, submission and 
social discipline, but –especially in the context of early 
seventeenth-century Venice– it serves well our purpose to 
shed light on essential characteristics of Catholic political 
theory. This study is based on the assumption that in order 
to understand a Catholic republic’s disobedience against 
the papacy it is crucial to see how closely the Catholic idea 
of obedience was related to notions of piety and spiritual 
perfection. This said, it might be possible and –somehow– 
justifiable to write a study on the interdict of Venice from 
the point of view of realpolitik and economic interests, to 
omit all references to religion and Catholicism, and yet to 
find a plausible explanation for Venetians’ clash with Rome. 
However, this would be at the cost of not fully appreciat-
ing the significance of Christian virtues and values to early-
modern culture, a particularly momentous flaw when trying 
to grasp a concept as laden with religious history as obedi-
ence is, and, furthermore, when analyzing the concept in 
relation to the papacy.
While it is difficult to say to which extent Sarpi’s political 
thought mirrored the views of his employers, the Venetian 
nobility, it is nonetheless safe to assume that he did not 
write –or speak or act– directly against the political goals or 
ideals of leading Venetian patricians such as Leonardo Donà, 
Antonio Querini and Nicolò Contarini. By and large, Sarpi’s 
political ideas were in line with those of the giovani, the 
political party led by Donà, Querini and Contarini, who were 
2  Cozzi, G. 1995: 35: “Il cattolicesimo… garantiva il rispetto per la 
gerarchia, per l’autorità, ispirava ai popoli le norme morali indispensabili 
per una buona convivenza nell’ambito statuale, era per loro un freno, un 
invito all’ordine, all’accettazione rassegnata e serena della loro sorte di 
sudditi”.
particularly eager to assert Venice’s independence from any 
external political forces, including Rome. The giovani have 
been described as an anticlerical party, as a clique chiefly 
marked by their opposition to the conservative, pro-papal 
party known as the vecchi. While this distinction is essen-
tially correct, it nevertheless blurs concepts such as ‘con-
servative’, ‘anticlerical’, and ‘obedience’ in the context of 
early-modern Venetian politics. First of all, I argue that Sarpi, 
Donà, Querini and Contarini were just as conservative as the 
vecchi in the sense that they considered themselves pious 
Catholics, and, accordingly, regarded obedience as a funda-
mental Christian virtue. To label them anticlerical, or anti-
papal, is problematic, because they did not attack papacy 
or priesthood as such, as Christian offices, but merely criti-
cized the abuse of the authority that came with such offices. 
The distinction between giovani and vecchi was real and no 
doubt followed the delineation given above –giovani being 
more critical of the clergy and hence appearing more pro-
gressive while vecchi, who remained loyal to the papacy, 
assumed a more conservative outlook–, but we should not 
ignore the inherently conservative nature of the concept of 
obedience adopted by Sarpi and the giovani. In what fol-
lows, I first explore the Christian –and Catholic– roots of the 
early-modern idea of obedience and then move on to dis-
cuss the influence of contemporary political theories such 
as absolutism and the divine right of kings on the political 
thought of Sarpi, the most influential figure amongst early 
seventeenth-century Venetian polemicists. 
I begin by briefly analyzing the notions of ‘vow’ and 
‘oath’, which early-modern church and state employed to 
kindle religious and civil obedience. In general, a vow was 
considered a voluntary promise made to God for his honour, 
whereas oath was seen as a voluntary promise made to 
men. Oath too was made in honour of God and those who 
made an oath invoked God as their witness, but, as speci-
fied by Thomas Aquinas, of these two only vowing signified 
an act of religion, whereas that what was sworn in an oath 
did not necessarily have anything to do with religion, nor 
did it become a religious act simply because God’s name 
was being glorified in the process of swearing.3 The Oath 
of Allegiance demanded by James I in 1606 is a famous 
example of an oath that aimed to strengthen the authority 
of secular rulers at the expense of that of the pope. As we 
will see, Sarpi approved of the Oath of Allegiance, but was 
critical of the king’s involvement in theological debates that 
followed the oath of 1606. 
The idea of a vow of obedience can be traced back to the 
early-Christians’ strive for spiritual perfection, which was to 
be achieved through a series of self-denial. The first steps in 
turning away from the world consisted of solitude, simplic-
ity, celibacy and penance, but to these was gradually added 
obedience as a useful means to follow Christ and to achieve 
absolute renunciation.4 At the core of obedience lied the 
act of renouncing one’s own will. According to the Catholic 
3  Gray, J.M. 2010. “Vows, oaths, and the propagation of subversive 
discourse”. Sixteenth Century Journal XLI/3: 738-739.
4  Schaefer, J. 2000. The evolution of a vow: obedience as decision 
making in communion: 29. Lit Verlag. 
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doctrine the “root of sin is in the heart of man, in his free 
will”. Man has the choice to do evil, to abuse his freedom 
and submit himself to the “slavery of sin”, or to do good and 
grow in perfection.5 The first amounts to disobedience and 
violation against God, while the latter is achieved by observ-
ing the will of God, which is communicated to man in the 
form of recta ratio, right reason. Obedience was thus the 
Christian’s way towards spiritual perfection and freedom. 
The concept of spiritual perfection through obedi-
ence, alongside with contemporary philosophies such as 
Neostoicism and absolutism, are of key importance to our 
understanding of the obedience that Sarpi showed to his 
secular sovereign and the disobedience that he expressed 
against his religious superior. It is equally important to be 
aware of the popularity of the view –eagerly adopted in 
early seventeenth-century Venice– according to which 
secular rulers were divinely appointed executors of God’s 
will in all temporal matters within their own territories. To 
a certain extent, this mandate also included religious affairs: 
“pious Christian princes” who were “principal members of 
the church”, Sarpi argued, made “many laws” and “judged 
over many cases”, which pertained to “pure ecclesiasti-
cal government”.6 These two points –first, that obedience 
contributed to spiritual perfection, and, second, that secu-
lar rulers commanded on a divine mandate– formed the 
intellectual background for Venice’s opposition to Paul V in 
1606. While Venetians were not at all inimical to the idea 
that papal authority too was of divine origin, they did think 
that Paul V had exceeded his mandate. Not only did this 
mean that the pope’s orders were to be considered “unjust, 
invalid and null” –as the senate replied to the papal nuntio– 
but it was the duty of the government of Venice to disclose 
and fight the pope’s abuse of power.7 At the same time, 
Sarpi and other Venetian polemicists insisted that as far 
as Venetian subjects were concerned, the true obedience 
–the one that contributed to spiritual perfection and salva-
tion– consisted of the loyalty shown to the republic, not to 
the pope. As we will see, Sarpi went as far as implying that 
–n the context of the interdict crisis– obeying the pope 
equaled to committing sin. 
A keen defender of the political autonomy of the repub-
lic of Venice against the attempts of the papacy to interfere 
with Venice’s legislation, Sarpi is the paragon of a political 
writer who based his viewpoint on the assumption that 
secular rulers were to be obeyed under all circumstances, 
because their power came directly from God and was, there-
fore, absolute and irresistible. Besides being thoroughly 
absolutistic, his political thought was informed by the divine 
right theory of kings. Would Sarpi have been French or 
English and writing in defense of his own king, his position 
would have been a typical one and in line with the majority 
5  Catechism of the Catholic Church. 2000: 389, 409. Burns & Oates.
6  Sarpi, P. 1968. G. da Pozzo (ed.), Scritti Scelti: 481. Torino: Classici 
Utet: “si come già a tutti li fideli toccava parte di questo governo spiri-
tuale, così li principi cristiani pii, come membri principali della chiesa, 
hanno fatto molte legi, giudicate molte cause spettanti al puro governo 
ecclesiastico”.
7  Sarpi, P. 1968: 220, note 2: “noi stimiamo questa escomunica 
ingiusta, invalida et nulla”.
of royalist and anti-papal polemics of the day. What makes 
his case unusual, however, is the fact that he was a citizen 
of a Catholic republic and, what is more, a Servite friar. How 
could a citizen of a republic become a theorist of absolut-
ism and the divine right of kings? How could a Catholic friar 
advocate absolute obedience to secular rulers and explic-
itly deny the infallibility of the pope? How could he argue 
that blind obedience to the pope was a sin? These contra-
dictions, while representing only a fragmentary insight into 
Catholic political thought, reveal some of the richness and 
inherent complexities of early-modern Catholicism. 
Sarpi never converted from Catholicism, although he did 
diverge from the more widely adopted Catholic view (most 
famously defended by cardinal Robert Bellarmine) accord-
ing to which the pope could exercise indirect power over 
secular rulers and their subjects also in temporal matters. It 
should be stressed that Sarpi’s criticism of the papacy does 
not mean that he was a clandestine Protestant or an athe-
ist, as some scholars have suggested.8 He was closely con-
nected –through reading, conversing and corresponding– to 
the chief intellectual currents of the period and had the out-
look of a supra-confessional Renaissance erudite. Beneath 
the veneer of learned skepticism and anti-dogmatism, there 
was, however, a friar who longed for a reform of the Church 
of Rome. Like the sixteenth-century Protestant reformers, 
Sarpi too allied with the representatives of secular author-
ity. Whether his allies –the giovani– were equally interested 
in a religious reform, however, is a question that needs to be 
addressed elsewhere. 
It has been noted that the first decades of seventeenth 
century witnessed an important shift in the discourse 
on political contract. The shift resulted in what has been 
labeled a “new psychology of consent”, submission to the 
ruler not anymore out of filial love of the sovereign, but out 
of self-interest and the individual’s own natural appetites.9 
While the scholarly discourse on social contract has often 
been conditioned by a secular reading of the early-modern 
understanding of contract and obedience, in this essay I 
emphasize the religious aspects of social discipline and 
argue that Sarpi’s conception of obedience was fundamen-
tally motivated by Christian notions of piety and spiritual 
perfection. A good example of the ‘new psychology of con-
sent’ and of a new focus on self-interest and self-preserva-
tion as the basis for obedience is Thomas Hobbes’s concept 
of fear as the most fundamental incentive behind all human 
action. Although Sarpi’s political theory and natural philoso-
phy contained many elements, which resembled Hobbes’s 
theories of political power, motion and human psyche, his 
thought remained traditional –that is, Christian– in that his 
idea of civil obedience was marked by his belief in the divine 
nature and origins of secular authority. Furthermore, Sarpi 
was thoroughly influenced by the Christian concept of spiri-
tual perfection and based his plea for obedience on scrip-
ture, although he made the important distinction between 
the word of God and that of clergy. God’s word as such, 
8  Wootton, D. 1983: 3-5, 136-145.
9  Kahn, V. 2004. Wayward contracts: the crisis of political obligation 
in England, 1640-1674: 58. Princeton University Press.
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as it was written in the Bible, was indubitable, while –he 
argued– those who interpreted the Bible often distorted the 
message for political purposes. Therefore, Sarpi concluded 
that “one shows absolute obedience to God”, but the obedi-
ence to the clergy has to be “a limited one” and “within the 
boundaries of divine law”.10 While Sarpi’s emphasis on the 
Bible and suspicion about the clergy as interpreters of the 
‘word’ might imply Protestant allegiances in his thought, I 
would rather see these points as indicative of his being part 
of the Catholic reformation that criticized corruption and 
clergy’s involvement in political affairs. Like other Catholic 
reformers, Sarpi valued spirituality, charity and the disci-
pline of the early church.11 
Servites are mendicant friars who take the three vows 
of obedience, poverty and chastity. Sarpi took these vows 
when he joined the order at the age of thirteen in 1565. His 
life was one characterized by monastic duties, ascetism and 
contemptus mundi, but also by political and reformist ambi-
tion, which manifested itself in his criticism of the papacy. 
He was at once a friar who strived for spiritual perfection 
and a politician whose principal goal was to cleanse the 
church, papacy and clergy of any aspirations to or assertions 
of temporal authority. His reformist aims were manifest in 
his attitude towards the Jesuits, whom he considered the 
“plague of the century”, because, according to him, their 
goal was to strengthen the “horrible omnipotence” of the 
pope.12 Not surprisingly, a considerable part of Sarpi’s writ-
ings were aimed against and responded by the Jesuit cardi-
nal Robert Bellarmine, a prelate, who has been seen as the 
paradigmatic representative of the Counter-Reformation 
church of Rome.13 The debate between the two Catholic 
theologians issued mainly from their different understand-
ing of the origins and justification of political power and, 
more to the point, from their conflicting views about the 
role of the papacy as far as temporal matters were con-
cerned. Bellarmine famously advocated the theory of potes-
tas indirecta, according to which spiritual goals were higher 
than temporal ones, and, consequently, papal power was 
superior to that of secular rulers.14 He rejected the idea that 
clergy and laity would form “two republics” and insisted 
that there was only one community, which was the church, 
ecclesia. In this church one authority had to be superior to 
the other so that there would not have been “two heads in 
one body” and, for Bellarmine, the superior power was in 
the hands of the clergy.15 In Sarpi’s opinion, on the contrary, 
10  Sarpi, P. 1940. M.D. Busnelli (ed.), Istoria dell’interdetto e altri 
scritti editi e inediti. Vol. II: 252. Bari: Laterza.
11  See, for example, Sarpi, P. 1961. Boris Ulianich (ed.), Lettere ai 
Gallicani: 5, 15, 183. Wiesbaden. 
12  Sarpi, P. 1961: 9: “pestis huius saeculi… Sola decreta pontificum 
vellent, et recentia prioribus praeponi, ut horribilem illam omnipoten-
tiam facilius confirmare possent”.
13  Tutino, S. 2010. Empire of souls: Robert Bellarmine and the 
Christian Commonwealth: 3-4. Oxford University Press. Tutino’s work 
nevertheless makes a departure from this traditional, oversimplified 
view and shows that Bellarmine played an important role in complicat-
ing and diversifying the early-modern Catholic political thought. 
14  Höpfl, H. 2004. Jesuit Political Thought: the society of Jesus and 
the state, c. 1540-1630: 339-365. Cambridge University Press.
15  Bellarmine, R. 1610. Tractatus de potestate Summi Pontificis 
in rebus temporalibus: 133-134: “clerici, & laici non faciunt duas 
temporal power was the superior one and he retorted that 
Bellarmine’s theory originated from the Church of Rome’s 
desire to “deprive princes of their power”.16 
Bellarmine attacked the English Oath of Allegiance of 
1606. In his view, the oath was mistaken in two fundamen-
tal issues: first, it ascribed “spiritual primacy” to the king; 
second, it deprived the pope of “that primacy”. In both 
questions, Bellarmine asserted, the Oath of Allegiance con-
tradicted the Scriptures.17 Bellarmine focused on the ques-
tion of spiritual primacy, because that is where, according to 
him, the supreme authority was. As discussed below, Sarpi 
separated the spiritual from the temporal and thus rejected 
Bellarmine’s theory of the pope’s indirect power. While the 
English Oath of Allegiance was compatible with Sarpi’s point 
of view, he did not approve of the theological contributions 
of James I. Sarpi believed that the king’s book Apologia pro 
juramento fidelitatis (1607) and the reception of the book 
were going to “cause a great impact”, although, he contin-
ued, “all the weighty matters would remain unchanged”. 
In the end, he wished that James I would have “rather 
been a King than an erudite”.18 This is crucial: contrary to 
Bellarmine, Sarpi subjugated ecclesiastical authority to that 
of secular rulers by way of strictly separating the spiritual 
from the temporal. Bellarmine in turn attempted to infuse 
‘spiritual primacy’ with political authority. James I admired 
Sarpi and invited the latter to England to enjoy his protec-
tion. In a carefully formulated letter to Dudley Carleton, the 
English ambassador to Venice, Sarpi politely rejected the 
monarch’s invite and asserted his desire to continue serving 
his own sovereign, the republic of Venice.19 
Besides rejecting Bellarmine’s theory of the pope’s indi-
rect power over secular rulers, Sarpi opposed himself to 
Ignatius Loyola’s theory of blind obedience. The idea of blind 
obedience was, Sarpi argued, a “new concept”, traditionally 
“unknown to the church and to every good theologian”, 
and, what is more, it “removes the essence of virtue, which 
is to operate through a certain knowledge and choice”. He 
then issued a warning against this sort of “abuse”, because 
it might lead to offenses against God and “cause seditions”, 
as had happened in the past.20 Sarpi may have been famil-
iar with Bellarmine’s De obedientia quae caeca nominatur, 
which the latter composed as a response to Julien Vincent’s 
attack against the idea of blind obedience in 1588. In the 
Respublicas, sed unam, id est, unam Ecclesiam… necessario debet, aut 
subesse, aut praesse, ne sint in uno corpore duo capita”.
16  Sarpi, P. 2006. Nina Cannizzaro (ed.), Della potestà de’prencipi: 
50. Venezia: Marsilio: “che il papa possi levare l’auttorità alli prencipi”.
17  Bellarmine, R. 1608. Matthaei Torti Responsio: 20: “Iuramentum 
tribuit spiritualem potestatem ei, cui secundum Scripturas sanctas 
minime debetur, posterius vero detrahit eumdem Primatum ab eo, cui 
secundum easdem Scripturas omni iure debetur”.
18  Sarpi, P. 1968: 596: “L’animo mi pronostica che siino per produrre 
qualche grande effetto queste leggerezze, poiché veggo le cose grandi 
tutte restar senza effetti. Io vorrei il re d’Inghilterra più re che dotto”.
19  Sarpi, P. 1968: 652-655 (the date of the letter is 14 August 1612). 
20  Sarpi, P. 1968: 291-292: “il nuovo nome di obedienza cieca, inven-
tato da Ignazio Loiola, fu incognito alla Chiesa et ad ogni buon teologo, 
leva l’essenziale della virtù, che è operare per certa cognizione et elle-
zione, espone a pericolo di offender Dio... e può partorire delle sedizioni, 
che si sono vedute da 40 anni in qua, doppo che questo abuso è intro-
dotto”; For the Jesuits and ‘blind obedience’, see Höpfl, H. 2004: 29.
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treatise Bellarmine argued that blind obedience was “pure, 
perfect and simple”, a Christian virtue, and expected from 
every Christian with the exception of such command-
ments which would entail sin. Bellarmine also pointed out 
that Loyola was not the first Christian to emphasize the 
importance of obedience.21 It should be stressed that Sarpi 
attacked the Jesuits rather than the idea of obedience. More 
to the point, it was not obedience as such that Sarpi was 
opposed to, but obedience to such prelates who exceeded 
the boundaries of their métier by making claims to tempo-
ral authority. Instead of blindly obeying such priests, Sarpi 
advised Christians to examine the commandment given to 
them, even when this came from the pope, and to study 
whether the commandment was “convenient and legiti-
mate and obligatory”. The one who “obeys blindly”, Sarpi 
concluded, “commits a sin”.22 In another piece of writing he 
warned against the kind of theology, which aimed to con-
fuse the kingdom of God with the kingdoms of this world 
and “fools the simple and the unlearned” to believe that “in 
all things there is an obligation to obey the pope”.23 
Knowledge and information played important roles in 
the relations between rulers and their subjects, and igno-
rance could be used as an excuse to avoid submission to 
an inconvenient rule or commandment. The argument 
that a vow or an oath was invalid when made without suf-
ficient knowledge or out of sheer ignorance was often used 
to undermine either religious vows or state oaths. Many 
English Protestants, for instance, claimed that monastic 
vows were made in ignorance, because they lasted for a life-
time and the vower could not possibly know whether he or 
she would be able to keep the vow in future when the cir-
cumstances would be different from what they were in the 
moment of making the vow. Some refused to swear a politi-
cal oath under the excuse that they did not have adequate 
knowledge about the matter in question and claimed that 
to swear an oath under such conditions amounted to per-
jury.24 While Sarpi readily encouraged this sort of resistance 
as far as papal authority was concerned, he could not have 
expressed a more different sentiment with regard to secular 
authorities. These were always to be obeyed, even blindly, 
and Sarpi explicitly urged secular sovereigns to rule their 
subjects by keeping them ignorant of public matters: “the 
right manner to govern a subject”, he wrote, “is to keep him 
from knowing public affairs”.25 
There is a striking difference, then, between Sarpi’s view 
of obedience to secular rulers on the one hand, and to the 
papacy on the other. Writing during the interdict of Venice 
he was particularly keen to thwart the attempts of pope Paul 
V to interfere in the matters of the republic and to encour-
age disobedience against what he considered usurpation of 
21  Tutino, S. 2010: 61-62.
22  Sarpi, P. 1940. Vol. III: 21: “chi ubidisce alla cieca, pecca”.
23  Sarpi, P. 1940. Vol. III: 64: “bisogna guardarsi dal teologizzare in 
questo modo, col quale si disforma e disordina e il regno di Dio e quelli 
del mondo, e sono ingannati li semplici, e indotti a credere che in tutte le 
cose vi sia obligo di obedire al papa!”.
24  Gray, J.M. 2010: 744-745, 755. 
25  Sarpi, P. 1968: 534: “il vero termine di regger il suddito è mante-
nerlo senza saputa delle cose publiche”.
papal power. In his view Venetians were entitled to react 
against the interdict, because both God and the natural law 
authorized the victim of an unjust attack to “fight power 
with power”.26 The obedience that Christians were expected 
to show to the pope was further justified by the idea of 
papal infallibility, an idea explicitly rejected by Sarpi: “it is 
certain that the pope can err in particular judgments”, even 
if he happened to be diligent and had good intentions, and 
“many of them have de facto erred”.27 Sarpi’s rejection of 
the idea of papal infallibility functioned as a justification for 
disobedience against papal authority. 
The fact that Sarpi questioned the pope’s authority over 
secular rulers and asserted the latter’s sovereign power over 
the clergy provoked critical responses from writers such as 
Antonio Possevino, the Jesuit controversialist, according 
to whom Sarpi aimed to “castrate” books of “sane theol-
ogy” and to use the “mutilated” books in order to erase the 
“light of truth” and the “proper obedience to the church 
of God”.28 Sarpi’s thoughts were poisonous, another Jesuit 
argued, and his writings led to a “loss of faith and Catholic 
religion” and left his followers with nothing but “misery and 
unhappiness”.29 Paul V himself confirmed that “the books of 
fra Paolo are replete with exorbitant heresies”.30 As the case 
of William of Ockham shows, Sarpi was by no means the 
first friar in history to criticize his religious superiors. Both 
attacked the idea of plenitudo potestatis and the pope’s 
right to interfere in temporal matters, and both were pun-
ished with excommunication. In general, Sarpi’s political 
thought was in line with Ockham’s and Marsilius of Padua’s 
criticism of papal authority and this was also understood by 
his contemporaries: Sarpi’s writings consist of “things taken 
from Marsilius of Padua, condemned and damned already 
for two hundred years”, Possevino argued in his polemic 
reply to a Venetian senator.31 
Besides Ockham and Marsilius of Padua, Jean Gerson 
–the French scholar and a leading figure in the conciliarist 
movement– numbers amongst those late medieval thinkers 
26  Sarpi, P. 1968: 465: “Questo rimedio è de iure naturali, che chi 
ingiustamente è assalito possi vim vi repellere. Concede Dio e la natura 
che quando l’avversario contro raggione usa la forza, la raggione nostra 
sii sostentata colla forza”. 
27  Sarpi, P. 1940. Vol. III: 22-23: “Questo è certo, che il pontefice può 
fallare nelli giudicii particolari, eziandio avendo usato ogni diligenza, e 
anco con buona intenzione: e molti de facto hanno errato”. 
28  Possevino, A. 1606. Risposta di Teodoro Eugenio di Famagosta: 
57. Bologna: “I libri di sana Teologia… sono da due anni in qua stati 
castrati da Fra Paolo Servita… & mandati fuori colle parti mutilate, acciò 
che si togliesse la luce della verità, & della dovuta ubidienza alla chiesa 
di Dio”.
29  Della Bastida, H. 1607 Antidoto alle velenose considerationi di 
Fra Paolo di Venetia: 188. Roma: “perdere la fede, & Religione Cattolica… 
non gli resta altro che miseria, & infelicità”.
30  I quote from Pin, C. 2006, “’Qui si vive con esempi, non con 
ragione’: Paolo Sarpi e la committenza di Stato nel dopo-Interdetto”, en 
C. Pin (ed.), Ripensando Paolo Sarpi. Atti del convegno internazionale 
di studi nel 450° anniversario della nascita di Paolo Sarpi: 351. Venezia: 
Ateneo Veneto: “I libri di fra Paulo sono ripieni di essorbitanti eresie”.
31  Possevino, A. 1606: 6: “sono cose lievate da Marsilio di Padova già 
dugento anni convinto & dannato”. On Sarpi, Ockham and Marsilius of 
Padua, see Kainulainen, J. 2014: 166-167. See also Frajese, V. 1994. Sarpi 
scettico. Stato e chiesa a Venezia tra ´500 e ´600: 409 note 62. Bologna, 
for the argument that Sarpi was familiar with Marsilio’s Defensor Pacis. 
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who influenced Sarpi’s political thought. Sarpi translated 
into Italian Gerson’s tract on the validity of excommuni-
cations.32 Published during the interdict crisis, Gerson’s 
treatise served Venice’s propaganda against the ban. 
Commenting on the publication of the treatise in his his-
tory of the interdict Sarpi mentioned an “anonymous letter” 
(in reality written by Sarpi) attached to the tract, exhorting 
Venetian priests “to attend their churches without any fear 
of offending God by disobeying the interdict”.33 Again, Sarpi 
made the crucial distinction between the word of God and 
that of the clergy. In his view it was possible to resist the 
clergy without violating against God, because divine and 
ecclesiastical authorities were not identical. Elsewhere Sarpi 
opposed himself to those who claimed that the “pope is a 
God, almighty” and even capable to “square the circle”.34 He 
argued that the greatest political problem of the period was 
the popes’ claim to temporal power: “I think”, he wrote to 
the French lawyer Jacques Leschassier, “that all the religious 
controversies that trouble the world, can be reduced to this 
one: the power of the pope”.35 Sarpi was troubled by the 
views of writers such as Agesilao Mariscotti who considered 
“pontifical power” superior to any other authority also in 
questions related to temporal affairs.36 Furthermore, Sarpi 
observed that the popes themselves encouraged this line 
of thought and accused Paul V of considering it his principal 
task to expand ecclesiastical authority.37
Sarpi’s response was to separate the spiritual from the 
temporal sphere. The spiritual power, he specified, “is not 
from this world, it is from the kingdom of heavens” and this 
is why spiritual and temporal authorities “do not walk the 
same way”. In his view, spiritual power did not have any of 
the qualities of the temporal one.38 Although Sarpi sepa-
rated religion from politics, this separation did not bestow 
any civil privileges on the clergy. As far as the common good 
was concerned, Sarpi argued that the clergy had no special 
status and was “not exempt from the observance of civil 
laws or from the power of the lawmaker”.39 On the other 
hand, “ecclesiastical authority” was valid only as far as it 
32  Micanzio, F. 1974. Vita del padre Paolo dell’ordine de’servi e teo-
logo della serenissima republica di Venetia, en C. Vivanti (ed.), Sarpi, P. 
Istoria del Concilio Tridentino, 2 vols: 1334-1335. Torino. 
33  Sarpi, P. 1968: 287: “A questo s’aggionse una lettera senza nome 
dell’auttore, che esortava li curati ad attendere alle loro chiese, senza 
timore di offender Dio non servando l’interdetto”. 
34  Sarpi, P. 1968: 34: “invenient papam deum esse, omnia posse... et 
tandem etiam circulum quadrare”.
35  Sarpi, P. 1863. F.-L. Polidori (ed.), Lettere, vol. II: 167 Firenze: “Io 
per me tengo che tutte le controversie religiose che turbano il mondo, 
vadano a risolversi in quest’una: del potere del papa”.
36  Mariscotti, A. 1607. Aviso sicuro contro il mal fondato aviso del 
Signor Antonio Quirino Senator Veneto: 72. Bologna: “la Podestà ponti-
ficia, è come superiore ordinata a regolare tutte l’altre, e che il Papa… è 
Padrone della spada temporale, non meno, che della spirituale”.
37  Sarpi, P. 1968: 169: “assonto al pontificato, niuna cosa si pro-
pose per scopo e somma dell’officio suo, se non agrandire l’auttorità 
ecclesiastica”.
38  Sarpi, P. 1968: 604-606: “At ea potestas non est de hoc mundo, 
regni caelorum est; nihil quidquam mutuae operae a terreno rege susci-
piet, aut praestabit. Quid mirum? Non in eodem ambulant, obviare non 
possunt”.
39  Sarpi, P. 1968: 482-483: li clerici non sono esenti dall’osservanza 
delle legi temporali, né dalla potestà di chi le statuisce”. 
regarded the “eternal salvation”; it could not have “anything 
temporal as its goal”.40 Elsewhere Sarpi specified that God 
had established “two rules in the world, one spiritual, the 
other temporal”, both being “supreme and independent 
from one another”. The first, “ecclesiastical ministry”, per-
tained to the popes, while the latter, “political rule”, was the 
realm of secular rulers.41 
Besides distinguishing between spiritual and temporal 
spheres, Sarpi divided the spiritual into two distinct fields: 
one that dealt with “the kingdom of heavens” and another 
which took care of the “external discipline”.42 This separa-
tion has a long history and is better known as the division of 
ecclesiastical authority into power of order (potestas ordi-
nis) and power of jurisdiction (potestas jurisdictionis), the 
first of which consisted of the administration of the sacra-
ments, while the latter denoted the administrative, judi-
cial and legislative aspects of the church government; the 
first was exclusively spiritual by nature, but the latter often 
competed with the authority of secular rulers.43 Sarpi read-
ily acknowledged the clergy’s power of order, but most of 
his written work aimed to set limits to the clergy’s power of 
jurisdiction. 
Whether the ecclesiastical potestas jurisdictionis 
included the power to coerce was one of the most crucial 
questions in early-modern debates on church-state rela-
tions. In contrast to writers like Robert Bellarmine who 
argued that the pope possessed coercive power also over 
secular rulers,44 Sarpi maintained that neither Christ nor the 
apostles ever claimed to have “coersive temporal author-
ity over sins”. In the passage in question Sarpi denied the 
pope the authority to judge over every sin, because this sort 
of exclusive power would have made him the only prince 
on earth. Furthermore, Sarpi rejected the idea that the 
pope would have been the “head of Christianity”, because 
Christianity meant not only the Christian church, but also 
Christian republics and kingdoms. Admitting that the pope 
was the head of Christianity would have invested papacy 
with such power, which would have kept Christianity in a 
state of “eternal perturbation”.45 Bellarmine, on the other 
hand, invested the papacy precisely with such power, argu-
ing that the pope was the head of an “empire of souls” –that 
40  Sarpi, P. 1968: 483: “L’auttorità ecclesiastica non risguarda altro 
che la salute eterna, né li è concesso aver per fine alcuna cosa temporale”. 
41  Sarpi, P. 1968: 290: “Dio ha instituito dui governi nel mondo, uno 
spirituale, l’altro temporale, ciascuno di essi supremo e indipendente 
l’uno dall’altro… si che li uni non possino intromettersi in quello che 
agl’altri appartiene”.
42  Sarpi, P. 1968: 603-604: “Ego de potestate ecclesiastica distinxi, 
ut altera sit quae ad regnum caelorum spectet, altera quae hanc exter-
nam disciplinam regat”.
43  Oakley, F. 1991. “Christian Obedience and Authority, 1520-1550”, 
en J.H. Burns (ed.), The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450-
1700: 162-163. Cambridge University Press.
44  Bellarmine, R. 1610: 156: “arma ipsa spiritualia possunt cogere 
Remp. temporalem, & eius Principem”.
45  Sarpi, P. 1940. Vol. III: 64-67: “se al pontefice romano appartiene 
metter le mani sopra ogni peccato… non vi è più principe alcuno, se non 
il papa... con questa dottrina (that the pope is the head of Christianity), 
o bisogna levar ogni principato, o tener in perpetue perturbazioni la cris-
tianità... esempi di Cristo e de´santi apostoli, li quali non hanno mai pre-
teso sopra li peccati autorità temporale coattiva”.
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is, the universal church–, an entity, which included all the 
secular rulers confessing Christian faith.46 
In thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas listed obedience 
amongst chief virtues and claimed that man’s first sin was 
disobedience. This was reflected in God’s plan according 
to which Adam’s original sin –his disobedience against the 
divine rule– was eventually atoned by Christ’s voluntary 
obedience to his Father.47 Sarpi was, needless to say, familiar 
with Aquinas’ work and approved of the latter’s definition of 
sin as “deprivation of good”. In line with this argument, Sarpi 
asserted that the “good that deprives disobedience” is a pri-
vate ‘good’ of a subject, in other words, his “virtue of obedi-
ence”. Sarpi nevertheless continued that “good government 
of the church” was a greater virtue than obedience, because 
“public good is greater than private”. It follows from this 
that abuses in ecclesiastical government, being public by 
nature, were greater vices than disobedience, which was a 
private vice. Sarpi claimed that abuse of power could lead 
to much worse than a “hundred disobediences” and there-
fore the one who had power had a “greater obligation from 
God to his duty”.48 At the same time, he never made such 
concessions to disobedience as far as temporal authority 
was concerned. In the quotation above Sarpi aimed to jus-
tify Venice’s disobedience against Paul V who, according to 
Venetians, had abused his power when he placed Venice 
under the ban of interdict. At the same time, however, the 
passage shows that for Sarpi obedience was a religious con-
cept, one that was closely tied to Christian concepts of sin, 
virtue and man’s obligations towards God. 
Aquinas helped his readers to submit themselves to God 
by classifying “three kinds of human goods” which a man 
could renounce “for God’s sake”. The lowest ones of these 
were external goods, the intermediary level consisted of 
things related to the body, while the highest ones were “the 
goods of the soul”. Of these, in turn, the supreme good was 
the will. This was why the “virtue of obedience, by which 
we despise our own will for God’s sake, is more praisewor-
thy than the other moral virtues by which we despise other 
goods for God’s sake”.49 In the same passage Aquinas speci-
fied that the act of renouncing these goods had to be done 
out of obedience as much as out of charity, which, he con-
tinued, could not exist without obedience. In keeping with 
his claim that the renunciation of one’s own will was the 
greatest act a man could do in God’s honour, Aquinas based 
his soteriology on the idea of Christ’s absolute obedience to 
God. It should be stressed, however, that Aquinas’ concept 
of absolute obedience did not entail loss of freedom of the 
46  Tutino, S. 2010. 
47  Armitage, M. 2010. “Obedient unto death, even death on a 
cross: Christ’s obedience in the soteriology of St. Thomas Aquinas”. Nova 
et Vetera, English Edition, Vol. 8, No. 3: 509, 513, 525.
48  Sarpi, P. 1940. Vol. III: 103: “San Tomaso… sempre dice il peccato 
esser privazione del bene... il bene che priva l’inobedienzia è un bene 
privato del suddito, che è la virtù sua dell’obedienzia; il bene che priva 
l’abuso della potestà è il buon governo della chiesa: questo è bene molto 
maggiore, si perché il ben publico è maggior del privato… è causa di 
maggior rovina un abuso di potestà che cento inobedienze; e la persona 
del superiore… ha maggior obligo da Dio di far il debito suo”.
49  Aquinas, T. 2002. R.W. Dyson (ed.), Political writings: 64. 
Cambridge University Press.
will. As noted above, Aquinas held that Christ’s obedience 
was voluntary. More precisely, Christ obeyed out of charity, 
“out of love, to the Father’s command”, and such obedience 
was never based on necessity.50 It followed from this that 
it was possible to obey God’s commandments without los-
ing the freedom of one’s own will. This was because God 
was the creator and the cause of all things: “St. Thomas 
said well”, Sarpi wrote, “that nothing, which is moved by its 
cause, is moved violently; and if men were moved by God, 
their works would be voluntary”.51 But were men moved 
by God? Sarpi answered in the positive in his De Auxiliis, a 
short treatise, which commented on the dispute over grace 
and salvation between the Dominicans and the Jesuits. In 
the treatise Sarpi argued that it was a “fundamental article 
of Christian belief” that man needed “grace, that is, divine 
help, in order to obtain salvation”.52 He then explained that 
grace was divine motion, which turned the will from its evil 
inclination and guided it towards good. While this motion 
was physical action inside the will, it did not violate the 
freedom of the will, because it originated from God.53 Sarpi 
confirmed his belief in the divine and natural origins of the 
free will in one of his consulti.54 In line with the Augustinian 
interpretation of grace and free will Sarpi concluded his 
De Auxiliis by noting that “as St. Augustine says, we do not 
acquire divine grace by our freedom, but by divine grace 
we achieve freedom”.55 Freedom, like obedience, was a 
Christian concept for Sarpi. In his view, freedom depended 
on the elevating force of divine grace. 
In the Christian tradition, obedience to God was a pecu-
liar mixture of submission, affection, freedom and atone-
ment for Adam’s sin. In Sarpi’s view these elements were 
present in civil obedience too, because the obedience that 
was performed to legitimate rulers was, ultimately, obe-
dience to God. He made this point with a reference to St. 
Paul’s letter to Romans: “for there is no authority except 
from God” and who resists civil authority, which is “not 
human, but divine”, (s)he perforce “resists the divine will”.56 
Elsewhere Sarpi stated that man was “subject to the laws 
and orders of his spiritual and temporal superiors” simply 
“because God has commanded that he showed obedience 
50  Armitage, M. 2010: 525. 
51  Sarpi, P. 1996. L. Cozzi e L. Sosio (eds.), Pensieri naturali, metafi-
sici e matematici: 154. Milano-Napoli: “Ben disse adunque S. Tommaso, 
che niuna cosa mossa dalla sua causa è violentemente mossa; e se gli 
uomini fosser mossi da Dio, le opere loro volontarie sarebbero”.
52  Sarpi, P. 1968: 157: “È articulo fondamentale della fede cristiana 
che l’uomo ha bisogno della divina grazia, cioè del divino agiutto, per 
ottener la salute”.
53  Sarpi, P. 1968: 163: “Sarebbe contro il libero arbitrio, se alcuna 
causa esterior alla volontà la movesse; ma quando la volontà muove se 
stessa o veramente è mossa da Dio che è più interno alla volontà che 
essa stessa, il moto è libero”. 
54  Sarpi, P. 1940. Vol. III: 69: “il libero arbitrio, il quale è naturale e 
da Dio”.
55  Sarpi, P. 1968: 163-164: “come S. Agostino dice, non per nostra 
libertà acquistiamo la grazia divina, ma per grazia divina conseguiamo 
la libertà”.
56  Sarpi, P. 2006: 34: “non enim est potestas, nisi a Deo... Non è cosa 
umana, ma divina il publico governo; chi se gli rende contumace resiste 
alla volontà divina”.
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to them”.57 God gave the power to rulers and that power as 
such entailed obedience. Here Sarpi’s position came close 
to that of Pierre Charron (whose work he was familiar with) 
who, like Sarpi, justified absolute obedience with references 
to St. Paul. Charron argued that one had to obey rulers not 
because they were good, but simply because their author-
ity was legitimate.58 Sarpi went as far as claiming that even 
wicked rulers were to be obeyed. Should such a prince give 
him a “prejudicial commandment”, Sarpi stoically asserted 
that “I cannot assent, but I will obey”.59 His friend Fulgenzio 
Micanzio –another Servite friar and adviser to the senate of 
Venice– made the same point in one of his sermons: “one 
has to obey princes, even if they were wicked and infedel”.60 
In Sarpi’s opinion, this was because all princes, even the 
wicked ones, were ministers of God and therefore execu-
tors of divine will.61 Furthermore, he noted that there were 
times when God reckoned it necessary to punish people 
with a wicked prince and times when God preferred to 
favour them with a good one.62 
Throughout his writings Sarpi recommends total sub-
mission to the will of God, a tendency, which suggests that 
he regarded obedience as an act of piety. Furthermore, he 
argued that people felt “natural affection” for their rulers 
whom –as discussed above– he considered ministers of 
God.63 That Sarpi considered secular, legitimate rulers repre-
sentatives of God suggests that he regarded the affection 
that subjects felt for their sovereign as an act of piety, an 
instance of man’s love of God. If we couple this point with 
the great emphasis that Sarpi put on the necessity of obe-
dience to secular rulers, it follows that his concept of obe-
dience encompassed Aquinas’s idea of the inseparability 
of obedience and charity (or love of God). While the obe-
dience that subjects showed towards their ruler reflected 
their love of God, it was the task of the ruler to inform the 
subjects about God’s will, which, in turn, was identical with 
right reason: 
“Nothing more correct is said, than that good action 
is that, which is in conformity with the right reason; the 
right reason in turn is that, which is in conformity with the 
right appetite; right appetite is indeed the will of God, and 
it appears to men as that, which is approved of by ever-
yone or by majority or by those, who are considered to be 
prudent”.64
57  Sarpi, P. 1940. Vol. III: 10: “l’uomo sia soggetto alle leggi e precetti 
de’ suoi superiori spirituali e temporali, perché Dio ha commandato che 
si presti obedienza loro”.
58  Kogel, R. 1972. Pierre Charron: 135. Genève.
59  Sarpi, P. 1996: 692: “Al comandamento pregiudiciale… Non posso 
assentire ma ubidirò”.
60  I quote from Rein, G. 1904. Paolo Sarpi und die Protestanten: 
224. Helsingfors. 
61  Sarpi, P. 1968: 488: “(principe) è un ministro di Dio”. 
62  Sarpi, P. 2006: 43: “quando è utile all’uomini l’esser ammoniti con 
li castighi, Dio li dà un principe cattivo, quando è utile loro esser favoriti, 
li dà un buono”. 
63  Archivio di stato, Venezia, Consultori in iure, 17 December 1618, 
f. 13, c. 240r: “Prencipi, verso quali hanno la naturale affettione”.
64  Sarpi, P. 1996: 227: “Nihil rectius dicitur quam eam actionem 
esse bonam, quae rectae rationi conformis est; recta vero est ratio, quae 
appetitui recto est conformis; rectus appetitus vere est voluntas Dei, 
The rivalry between spiritual and temporal authorities 
over loyal subjects often resulted in political controversies, 
which were nevertheless represented as religious issues. 
The topic of clergy’s marriage, for instance, was common-
place amongst many Protestant writers who advocated the 
marriage and thereby undermined the monastic vow of 
chastity and, more importantly, the authority of the Church 
of Rome.65 Being a Catholic friar himself Sarpi did not openly 
criticize the vow of chastity, although it has been sugges-
ted that he did sympathize with the idea of married clergy, 
because this turned the clergy’s affection from the pope 
to their wives, family and country, which in turn subverted 
ecclesiastical hierarchy and papal authority.66 While many 
Catholic writers regarded the clergy as exempt from tem-
poral jurisdiction, from the point of view of Protestant wri-
ters and those Catholics who –like Sarpi– allied with secular 
authorities in hope of a reform, the question of the clergy’s 
right to marry embodied the individual churchman’s proble-
matic position as a subject of both spiritual and temporal 
authorities. Jean Bodin’s argument that family was the “true 
image of the commonwealth” and, conversely, that com-
monwealth could be defined as “the rightly ordered gover-
nment of a number of families” reflected the importance 
of marriage to the sixteenth-century political discourse.67 
Bodin’s argument put emphasis on the importance of family 
as a fundamental constituent of a state and by so doing 
implied that marriage tied a priest more closely to the social 
and hierarchical structures of the state than to those of the 
church. Marriage at once strengthened the priest’s obliga-
tion to obey his temporal sovereign and weakened his loyalty 
to the pope. The civil element of marriage was understood 
also by Martin Luther, according to whom marriage was the 
“mother of all earthly laws” and whose followers regarded 
marriage not as a sacramental institution, but as a social 
estate of the earthly kingdom.68 Furthermore, Lutheran 
theologians claimed that the monastic vow of chastity was 
subordinated to the vow of marriage and that those canon 
laws, which prohibited the marriage of clergy were unscrip-
tural and therefore to be considered null.69 Marriage was, in 
this respect, one of the most conspicuous acts of defiance in 
front of the Church of Rome (not surprisingly, Luther, Calvin 
and Zwingli were all married). 
As we will see, Sarpi supported the clergy’s right to 
marry in his history of the council of Trent. His position 
was thus in line with that of the Lutheran theologians who 
subordinated the monastic vow of chastity to the vow of 
marriage. Since marriage pertained to temporal sphere, 
Sarpi’s choice to favour the vow of marriage over that of 
chastity advanced his general goal to vindicate and pro-
mote civic obedience. In his history of the council of Trent 
hominibus autem ille videtur, qui probatur omnibus aut pluribus aut iis, 
qui prudentes putantur”.
65  Gray, J.M. 2010: 732.
66  Bouwsma, W. 1968: 579. 
67  Reus-Smith, C. 1999. The moral purpose of the state: 95. 
Princeton University Press.
68  Witte, J. 2002. Law and Protestantism: the legal teachings of the 
Lutheran Reformation: 200-201. Cambridge University Press.
69  Witte, J. 2002: 202, 241, 243.
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–a critical response to Sarpi’s Istoria del concilio Tridentino– 
cardinal Sforza Pallavicino asserted that the council “rightly” 
confirmed the celibacy of the clergy, “despite all the oppo-
sing forces”.70 Sarpi made no references to these ‘opposing 
forces’ in his history, but related how, towards the end of 
the council, a group of Catholic theologians from Germany 
approached the council in the hope of revoking the prohi-
bition of the marriage of priests. Sarpi reiterated the rea-
sons given by these theologians, starting with the fact that 
many of the apostles were married and by noting that in 
the early church the marriage of the priests was conside-
red “free and licit”. Furthermore, civil law did not prohibit 
the marriage of the clergy. Although celibacy would have 
been desirable and recommended, most men were weak 
and only few were such that they did not feel the “carnal 
stimulation”. Marriage would put an end to adultery and 
lead to a chaste way of living, Sarpi remarked, while prohibi-
tion of marriage only decreased the number of priests and 
led to the absurd situation, in which married priests were 
rejected and “fornicators” tolerated.71 That the prohibition 
of marriage would lead to sin was a “frivolous argument”, 
Pallavicino replied and claimed that the benefits of the pro-
hibition were weightier.72 We can, however, safely conclude 
from Sarpi’s treatment of the marriage question in his his-
tory of the council of Trent that he shared the German theo-
logians’ desire to revoke the prohibition. 
Besides the vows of chastity and obedience, Sarpi took 
the vow of poverty. Prior to becoming a political adviser 
Sarpi had no salary at all. As far as his needs were concer-
ned, “he had none”, Micanzio noted, since he was “most 
rich in his poverty”, focusing on three things only: “service 
to God, studies and conversations”.73 Also later, when he 
already received a salary for his work as the senate’s adviser, 
his attitude towards earthly goods remained indifferent. His 
hostility towards luxury is evident in a consulto on taxation, 
which he wrote in 1617. While being willing to let landow-
ners and (great) merchants off easily, Sarpi was eager to tax 
medics, advocates and shop-keepers, not only because it 
was easier to uncover and assess their property (as opposed 
to landowners, for example), but also because they lived off 
the community and were therefore obliged to support the 
community in return. More to the point, Sarpi remarked 
that for the most part these professions were “futile and 
even harmful”, like everything that created “pomp, luxury 
and selling of words”.74 In the same counsel Sarpi observed 
70  Pallavicino, S. 1803. Istoria del concilio di Trento, libro XXIV: 392: 
“Meritamente il S. Concilio di Trento malgrado tutti i contrari sforzi ha 
raffermato il Celibato”.
71  Sarpi, P. 1835. Istoria del concilio Tridentino, libro VIII: 175-178. 
Mendrisio.
72  Pallavicino, S. 1803: 392: “Che poi questo vietamento porga 
materia a molti peccati, è opposizione assai frivola”.
73  Micanzio, F. 1974: 1308: “quanto a’ bisogni, nessuno n’aveva... 
richissimo nella sua povertà, senza entrate... tutta la sua vita era in tre 
cose occupata: il servizio di Dio, i studii e le conversazioni”.
74  Archivio di stato, Venezia, Consultori in iure, f. 13, cc. 83r-83v: 
“medici... avvocati... botteghieri... questi possono esser gravati con mag-
gior giustitia, perche se essi guadagnano essendoli prestata quella com-
modità dal publico, il dover vuole che lo sovvengano... sono inutili, anzi 
dannosi, come tutti li artefici, che servono in cosa di pompe, o lusso, et 
tutti quelli che vendono parole”.
how difficult it was to get correct information about people’s 
personal estate and salary for taxation purposes and noted 
that in Germany and the Netherlands this information was 
customarily given under an oath. However, Sarpi concluded 
that this would not work in Italy, because there were many 
rich people who preferred to appear poor and vice versa. 
Also, there were many merchants who would have been 
cast to bankruptcy if their real possessions, or lack of them, 
would have become known.75 Like any mendicant friar, Sarpi 
was indifferent, or even hostile, to riches and luxury. This 
ascetic attitude was in line with his reformist outlook, which 
manifested itself in criticism of corruption and admiration 
for the simplicity of the early church. 
Sarpi’s brief analysis of ecclesiastical benefices in a 
letter to Jacques Leschassier suggests that he was fully 
aware of an oath’s potential to generate weighty conse-
quences. In the letter Sarpi first asserted that while papal 
bulls could present the nominal beneficiary, a confirma-
tion from the senate was nevertheless required in order 
to make the nomination valid. Since bestowing a lucrative 
benefice on somebody was a certain way to gain this per-
son’s loyalty, the confirmation from the senate was neces-
sary in order to guarantee that the beneficiary would give 
his loyalty to Venice instead of Rome. Sarpi then moved on 
to express his discontent over the fact that beneficiaries 
did not “take any oath or make any promise to the prince”, 
which was why the republic was perpetually at odds with 
the Roman curia. “It would be an excellent measure”, he 
continued, “to add some kind of an oath should the oppor-
tunity arise”. This clearly shows that Sarpi approved of the 
English Oath of Allegiance, and he specifically mentioned 
in the letter that he was familiar with the oaths that were 
in use in England and France.76 The opportunity to intro-
duce such an oath in Venice never arrived, however, and 
in 1619, eleven years after the letter to Leschassier, Sarpi 
wrote a consulto in which he plainly discarded the idea that 
a member of the clergy could give an oath of allegiance to 
a temporal ruler. This was simply because all churchmen 
would already have pledged their allegiance to the pope 
and this would “always end up badly” from the sovereign’s 
point of view, because a “second oath cannot prejudice a 
former one”.77 
Sarpi’s writings provide plenty of evidence for the claim 
that he embraced the theory of absolutism. For instance, 
75  Archivio di stato, Venezia, Consultori in iure, f. 13, cc. 83r: “In 
Germania, et nelli Paesi bassi in questi tempi lo fanno col giuramento... 
molti sono ricchi, che vogliono parer poveri, et molti poveri, a chi mette 
conto parer ricchi. Et sarebbono assai mercanti di molto credito, che se 
fosse scoperto il vero del loro havere, sarebbono fatti fallire”.
76  Sarpi, P. 1961: 18: “Quod attinet ad beneficiorum ecclesiastico-
rum possessionem... Beneficiarius vero nihil principi iurat aut promittit. 
Pro hoc iure perpetua est controversia reipublicae cum romana curia... 
Aliquod iuramentum addere optimum consilium foret opportunitate 
observata. Anglicum vidi. Formam iuramenti quod episcopi Galliarum 
regi praestant, putavi esse fidelitatis tantummodo, si forte alia est, rogo 
te, ut euis exemplum videam”.
77  Archivio di stato, Venezia, Consultori in iure 13, 12 Agosto 1619, 
c. 323v: “il giuramento di fedeltà, il quale li Chierici non possono pre-
stare per un’altro giuramento di fedeltà precedente, che hanno prestato 
alli loro superiori... perche il secondo giuramento non può pregiudicar 
al primo”.
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when Paul V accused Venetian patricians of tyranny on the 
grounds that they made laws, which restricted individual 
subjects’ disposition of their property, Sarpi pointed out 
in his reply that the pope himself had argued that in the 
Church-state he could make whatever statutes he pleased 
and that these statutes were to be obeyed. This, Sarpi 
observed, justified the position of the Venetian patricians 
and acknowledged their “license” to “dispose property arbi-
trarily” and without any “hindrance from law”, because the 
patricians had exactly the same authority in Venice as the 
pope had in the Church-state.78 More explicitly in line with 
the theory of absolutism, Sarpi claimed in his Della potestà 
de’prencipi that any sovereign ruler was legibus solutus and 
responsible only to God:
“He who has the majesty commands everyone and no 
one can command him… he is not subject to any human law 
whatsoever, but he even commands all the laws… the king 
who is sovereign does not command according to laws, but 
(he commands) the laws themselves, and remains obliged 
only to God and his (own) conscience”.79
Sarpi also claimed that supreme power was “natural”, 
given by God, and impossible to be “restricted or limited 
by any creature”.80 His idea of hierarchy was fundamentally 
at odds with that of the representatives of the Church of 
Rome. Many Catholic writers who expressed their support 
and loyalty to the papacy regarded the pope as the supreme 
head of both spiritual and temporal matters and went as far 
as investing the pope with ius gladii, the power to impose 
capital penalties.81 In contrast to this, Sarpi denied the pope 
and the clergy any temporal authority and claimed that all 
priests were subjects to secular authorities and as such obli-
ged to obey the commandments of their sovereign ruler. 
The “ecclesiastics are citizens and part of the republic”, 
he wrote, and the “republic is governed by the laws of the 
prince”, which is why the clergy is “subject to them”. He con-
cluded that it was absurd to claim that the clergy was “not 
subject to secular laws” because this amounted to saying 
that they had “no laws at all”.82 
Sarpi bestowed all power to secular rulers who governed 
through civil legislation. At the same time, he made it clear 
that this power –and legislation– was of divine origin and 
subject to the inexplicable will of God. Although positive 
78  Sarpi, P. 1968: 179: “il pontefice... proponendo la diffesa della 
libertà ecclesiastica, non diffendeva quella, ma la licenza delli secolari di 
dispor delli beni ad arbitrio senza freno delle legi”.
79  Sarpi, P. 2006: 52: “Chi ha la maestà commanda a tutti e nessuno 
può commandar a lui… non è soggetta a nessuna legge umana, sia qual 
si voglia, ma egli commanda eziandio a tutte le leggi… Il re che è sovrano 
non commanda secondo le leggi ma alle leggi stesse, resta ubligato solo 
a Dio e alla sua consienzia”.
80  Archivio di stato, Venezia, Consultori in iure, 18 October 1618, f. 
13, c. 214v: “potestà naturale, data da Dio alla Rep., la quale non può 
esser ristretta, ò limitata da alcuna creatura”. 
81  See, for example, Stephanus, J. 1586. De potestate coactiva: 73. 
Roma. 
82  Sarpi, P. 1968: 483: “Li ecclesiastici sono cittadini e parti della 
republica; ma la republica si governa con le legi del principe; adunque 
essi li sono soggetti… Quelli che dicono li ecclesiastici non esser soggetti 
alle legi secolari danno in grande assordità, perché è tanto come se 
dicessero che sono senza legi… tranquillità publica mondana... Dio l’ha 
data alli principi secolari solamente”.
laws may have appeared arbitrary, they had to be obeyed, 
Sarpi argued, because “good laws” guaranteed that subjects 
remained “in peace and in abundance”. He then added that 
the aim of civil laws was to look after the “public good and 
tranquility and the commodity of the individual”.83 Any vio-
lation of positive law equaled to rebellion against God, Sarpi 
argued, because civil laws were “commanded by God” and 
“in conformity with the will of God”.84 In the same passage 
Sarpi explained that prior to the making of a civil law there 
was “no obligation by reason to act in one way rather than 
the other”. This is to say that positive law was not based on 
any idea of absolute justice or truth, but “once the law is 
made”, Sarpi wrote, “the obligation comes by virtue of it, 
and not of reason”. In other words, civil legislation was valid 
because it issued from God’s will, not because it stated a 
truth that was established by human deliberation. 
Only a few weeks before his death Sarpi summarized his 
political theory as follows:
“But the care of the common good, this God has 
entrusted only to the prince together with the majesty; 
wherefore it pertains to him (prince) exclusively to pre-
scribe the ways in which to conserve and maintain this 
good, whether with impositions, with war, with laws or 
other means, and in this matter whoever it would be, a 
confessor or somebody else, who would like to become 
a judge or a censor, offends the majesty and acts against 
that respect and reverence –which nature instills and 
God in holy Scriptures commands– which every person 
has to show to the prince, who is His (God’s) vicar and 
lieutenant”.85
In my view Sarpi was a deeply religious person who 
nevertheless felt that the common good of Christian citizens 
was best protected by the state, not by the church. Without 
renouncing the vow of obedience that he had made at the 
moment of joining the Servite order, he directed his obe-
dience and loyalty from his religious superiors to the secu-
lar government of Venice. This shift was in line with Sarpi’s 
absolutism, with his adoption of the divine right theory and, 
more specifically, with the idea that secular rulers were 
ministers of God. At the same time, he remained a Catholic 
friar. Sarpi’s position as a Catholic critic of papal authority 
and as a defender of secular rulers’ absolute sovereignty 
was in line with that of the contemporary political Gallicans 
who regarded their own monarch not just as a head of state, 
83  Sarpi, P. 1968: 460: “buone legi che mantengano li sudditi in pace 
et in abondanza et abbino per fine il bene e la tranquillità publica et il 
comodo de’ particolari”.
84  Sarpi, P. 1968: 486: “Tutte le cose comandate dalle legi umane 
sono tali, che inanzi la lege non ci era obligo di ragione di operare più 
a un modo che all’ altro; ma fatta la lege, l’obligazione nasce per virtù 
di essa, e non dalla ragione... sono fondamenti della republica”; p. 460: 
“utile allo stato suo, necessaria al buon governo e comandata da Dio”; p. 
461: “conforme al voler di Dio”.
85  I quote from Pin 2006: 392 note 98: “Ma la cura del ben com-
mune Dio l’ha commessa al Prencipe solo insieme con la Maestà: per il 
che a lui solo sta prescrivere li modi di conservare e mantenere questo 
bene, se con impositioni, se con guerra, se con leghe od altri mezi, et in 
questo chi che sia, o confessore od altro, che se ne voglia fare giudice o 
censore, offende la Maestà et opera contro quel rispetto e riverenza che 
la natura instilla e Dio nelle Sante Scritture commanda che ogni persona 
debba portar al Prencipe, che è suo vicario e luogotenente”.
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but also as the head of the church of France. For Sarpi, as for 
the French Gallicans, the pope was a figurehead –the leader 
of a universal, spiritual church– who had no political power 
over the emerging nation states. 
Conclusion
In this essay I have pointed towards certain complexities 
in early-modern Catholic political thought. As we have seen, 
Catholic theorists did not agree even on such basic notions 
–basic for Catholic theorists, that is– as the nature of papal 
power. This confusion complicated other important issues, 
including the question of obedience. I have argued that 
notwithstanding their opposition to the papacy Venetians 
regarded obedience as a Christian concept, which –while 
being applied to a secular system of government– remained 
an important means to express piety and devote submission 
to the will of God. This said, obedience was for Venetians a 
key constituent of social discipline and therefore an integral 
part of the myth of Venice as a peaceful, harmonious repu-
blic. The fact that Venetians considered obedience an act 
of piety and yet associated it in the first place with secular 
government complicated their relationship with the papacy. 
Their message was that true piety did not require abso-
lute obedience to the pope. On the contrary, following the 
theory of the divine right of kings –which attributed divine 
origins to secular authority– Venetians (especially Sarpi and 
the giovani) identified piety with unconditional obedience 
to the sovereign government of Venice. Alongside events 
such as the English Oath of Allegiance, the interdict of 
Venice marked the weakening of papal authority in front of 
the emergence of absolutistic nation states. 
In terms of Christian –or Catholic– tradition, Sarpi 
followed St. Paul, St. Augustine and St. Thomas in his inter-
pretation of obedience as an act of self-abnegation and 
piety. For St. Thomas and Sarpi the renunciation of one’s 
own will was the highest form of self-abnegation and thus 
the greatest manifestation of love of God. It is hardly a 
surprise that Sarpi, a Servant friar, insisted on this point 
and time after time asserted that every man was utterly 
dependent on God’s grace. It is unlikely that the senate 
–or the majority of the senate– would not have shared 
Sarpi’s view of obedience as an instance of piety. What is 
more surprising, however, is the decisiveness with which 
the senate (and Sarpi) urged Venetian citizens to direct 
their obedience –and piety– from the papacy towards the 
secular government of Venice. That they succeeded in this 
was largely due to the fact that Sarpi –and other Venetian 
polemicists– depicted obedience as a religious and pious 
concept. Furthermore, the shift of Venetians’ loyalty from 
Rome towards their own secular government reflected not 
only their patriotic pride over the republic’s repute as an 
independent and peaceful city-state, but also the fact that 
Venetians were keen to imitate the politics and political dis-
course performed in the absolutistic monarchy of France. 
Paradoxically, Venetian nobility’s eagerness to preserve the 
mythical social harmony of the republic led them towards 
the adoption of the language of absolutism. 
Venetians’ idea of obedience was inseparable from their 
understanding of Christian values, which –as Sarpi’s case 
suggests– were gleaned from the Catholic tradition esta-
blished by saints such as Paul, Augustine and Thomas. At 
the same time, Venetians resorted to absolutism and the 
theory of the divine right of kings in their attempts to justify 
their independence from and disobedience to the papacy. 
Sarpi’s idea of obedience was also shaped by his reformist 
tendencies, a fact, which further encouraged him to cha-
llenge his religious superior. Although fully in line with con-
temporary trends in political theory and practice (especially 
in France and England), early seventeenth-century Venice 
offers a paradoxical case of early-modern Catholic politi-
cal thought: a Catholic republic at odds with Rome and at 
once proud and neglectful of its own republican past; a 
case, which questions facile assumptions about concepts 
such as republicanism, absolutism and Catholicism, and 
shows that historical phenomena were rarely, if ever, just 
one thing or another. The way in which early seventeenth-
century Venetians merged the divine and the secular when 
they ascribed divine origins to Venice’s government and 
questioned the authority of the pope no doubt mirrored 
the contemporary power struggle between the papacy and 
secular rulers such as James I of England. That this struggle 
–and Venetians’ political attitude– should be seen as a part 
of a process of secularization seems an overly teleological 
interpretation of a period, which, at least to my mind, was 
conditioned by a constant overlapping of the secular with 
the spiritual and by a marked confusion about the proper 
scopes and duties of the church and the state. 
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